speech or debate privilege is an accepted part of the American political tradition, difficult questions concerning its scope and meaning continue to arise in the process of applying the privilege to the facts of specific cases.
One particularly complex question was raised recently in United States v. Craig, 3 a Seventh Circuit case in which the court was asked to determine to what extent, if any, state legislators are protected by a speech or debate privilege in federal criminal prosecutions. The legislators in the Craig case were charged with violating the Hobbs Act 4 and the mail fraud statute' in their conduct as state legislators. Had they been federal congressmen, a significant portion of the Government's evidence against them would have been barred by the federal speech or debate clause. Had they been prosecuted by state authorities for violation of a state law, the Illinois constitutional speech or debate clause 6 would have had the same effect. The Craig court, in essence, had to determine whether this same evidence could be used against the legislators simply because it was the federal government that was prosecuting them for commission of a federal crime. Thus far the case has generated three different judicial opinions on this question. The district court held that the state legislators in question were protected by the Illinois constitutional speech or debate clause. three judge panel of the court of appeals held that they were entitled to a federal common law speech or debate privilege." On rehearing, however, a majority of the full court held that no such federal common law speech or debate privilege exists. The legislators were only protected by common law official immunity. 9 This comment will review the Craig decisions and the Supreme Court cases on which the judges of the district and appellate courts relied. While, as will be seen, there are no Supreme Court cases which speak directly to the problems raised by a federal criminal prosecution of a state legislator, it is the thesis of this comment that the third Craig opinion most accurately reflects the law of privilege as the Supreme Court has articulated it, either directly or by implication. (a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
(b) As used in this section-(2)The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear, or under color of official right.... bile leasing business. Their conduct was alleged to violate the mail fraud statute." Prior to the indictment, Markert had been subpoened to testify before the grand jury investigating alleged corruption in the Illinois General Assembly. He had also voluntarily submitted to interviews with United States postal inspectors and with an Assistant United States Attorney. On all occasions he was represented by counsel and was informed of his fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination. He chose, nevertheless, to answer all questions put to him during the investigation.
After the indictment, Markert moved to dismiss on the grounds that the federal and Illinois speech or debate clauses' 2 constituted an absolute bar to his prosecution. Although the district court' 3 held that Markert was entitled to the protection of the speech or debate clause of the Illinois constitution,'
4 it concluded that the scope of the clause was not so broad as to bar his prosecution for the crimes of extortion and mail fraud. The speech or debate privilege operated as a substantive bar to prosecution only if legislative acts were made the basis of a charge or if inquiry into the legislative process was a necessary and essential part of the prosecution." Noting that "extortion and mail fraud are in no conceivable way part of the legislative process," and that the prosecution could proceed "without inquiry into the legislative process," the court refused to dismiss the indictment. 16 Markert then moved to have his pre-indictment statements suppressed, claiming that they were obtained in violation of the speech or debate privilege. The court agreed that Markert was entitled to an evidentiary privilege to the extent that the government attempted to inquire into his motives for or actual performance of legislative acts, and it ordered the suppression of certain portions of his testimony before the grand jury. Some of his statements to the postal inspectors and the Assistant United States Attorney were suppressed as well. In answer to the Government's argument that Markert had waived his privilege by voluntarily making his statements, the court held that the speech or debate privilege was not personal and could not be waived by an individual legislator.1 7
The Panel Decision
The Government appealed the suppression order,' asserting that the Illinois speech or debate clause could not be invoked by Markert because privilege under state law was inapplicable in federal criminal prosecutions. Both Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that privileges are to be controlled by "the principles of common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." 9 The Gov-U.S. 169 (1966) , and United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1971) , cases in which the Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion with regard to the scope of the federal speech or debate clause. See discussion accompanying notes 100-112 and notes 113-129 infra. 16 Brief for the United States at app. 8. '7 Brief for the United States at app. 15. This holding on the question of waiver was subsequently reversed by the court of appeals panel decision, 528 F.2d 773, 780 (7th Cir. 1976 ). The opinion of the full court, after rehearing, did not reach the issue of waiver, 537 F.2d. 957, 958 (7th Cir. 1976 ). Because the issue of waiver is tangential to the focus of this comment, it will not be further discussed in the body of the paper.
18 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970) allows the Government to appeal interlocutory rulings on the suppression of evidence.
" The language of both rules is essentially identical except that Rule 501 contains an additional provision ernment argued that no federal common law speech or debate privilege existed, and that neither "reason" nor "experience" counseled the creation of such a privilege in this case. 20 A three judge panel of the Seventh Circuit, with one judge concurring only in the result 2 ' agreed with the Government that under Rule 501 and Rule 26 "the admissibility of evidence in criminal cases in federal courts is governed by federal law and is not dependent upon diverse state laws, including state constitutional provisions. ' 22 The court, therefore, found that Markert could not invoke the protection of the speech or debate clause of the Illinois Constitution.
The panel next considered whether Markert was entitled to a federal common law speech or debate privilege.
2 It briefly reviewed several Supreme Court decisions interpreting the scope of the federal speech or debate privilege. Those decisions, according to the panel majority, indicate that the purpose of the federal provision is to prevent legislators from being threatened by prosecutions and convictions for the performance of their legislative duties. To insure this protection, the clause has both "substantive and evidentiary elements:" legislative that state law is to govern privileges in civil cases in which state law supplies the rule of decision. 20 In the alternative, the Government argued that any privilege which did exist should be considered personal and therefore waivable by the individual legislator. Brief for the United States at 36. 21 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1976). Judge Cummings wrote the majority opinion for himself and Judge Kunzig, Judge of the United States Court of Claims sitting by designation. Judge Tone, whose position differed substantially from that of the other two members of the panel, wrote a separate, concurring opinion which is discussed in the text accompanying notes 39-46 infra. 22 528 F:2d at 776.
2'
The court did not discuss whether the federal speech or debate clause protects state legislators. One Fourth Circuit case, Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 228 (4th Cir. 1973), suggests that the Supreme Court extended the federal clause to the states in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 376 (1951) . However, such a suggestion seems clearly wrong. The Supreme Court does not even consider Tenney a speech or debate clause case. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 n. 10 (1972) . Furthermore, no constitutional vehicle such as the fourteenth amendment exists by which an article, rather than an amendment, of the Constitution can be made binding on the states, and Article I, § 6 on its face applies only to the Federal Congress. See, Brief for the United States at 15 n.32.
acts cannot be made the basis of civil or criminal liability, and legislators cannot be made to answer questions about either their legislative activities or their motives for performing those activities.
2 4 Only the evidentiary aspect of the privilege was before the panel. The majority characterized it as a "necessary prophylatic 25 and maintained that its purpose was "the same as that of the substantive aspect of the Speech or Debate Clause: preservation of the independence of the legislature." 2 The Government argued, however, that independence of the legislature is only a concern when co-equal branches of the government are involved. At the federal level, the speech or debate clause serves a separation of powers purpose, "preserving the balance of power among the three co-equal branches of government.." 27 Because the federal government was prosecuting a state official in the instant case, there was no question of "intra-federal power" being upset:
The power to prosecute [Markert and the other legislators] . . . evolved from the co-equal functioning of all three federal branches. Congress ... passed the laws on which the prosecution rests; the executive ... elected to pursue the case; and the judiciary awaits to hear it.
8
The real issue, according to the Government, was whether failure to recognize a legislative privilege for state legislators in federal court would interfere with a legitimate state interest, since under a federal system of government national interests may not be protected "in ways that . . . unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the states. '29 Although admitting that states clearly have an interest in free legislative debate, the Government argued that absence of legislative privilege would not hamper that free debate. It maintained that the protection of the first amendment and the doctrine of official immunity would insure freedom of speech in state legislatures:
The first amendment, as interpreted today, protects all citizens from criminal prosecution on 24 528 F.2d at 777. 25 Id. at 778.
26 Id. 27 Brief for the United States at 29.
8 Id.
29 Id. at 30, quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) .
the basis of the type of political expression which gave rise to the doctrine of Speech or Debate. Absent separation of powers considerations, there is no corresponding benefit to be gained from extending the privilege beyond the ambit of first amendment protections. To the extent that the first amendment would not immunize state legislators from civil suits for libel and slander, the doctrine of official immunity would provide the necessary protection. 30 Furthermore, the Government argued, the states have a legitimate interest in obtaining federal assistance in the area of crime control, and that interest would be furthered "by the federal government's attempt to use its resources to assist in excising the malignancy of local political corruption." 3 ' The panel majority felt strongly that the government's position ignored the basic concept of federalism envisioned by the drafters of the Constitution: the national government was designed to be one of limited powers and the states were to continue as essential units of government. 32 According to the two judge majority, state legislators have as vital a role to play in the government of a state as Congress has in the government of the nation. Independence of the state legislatures cannot, therefore, be dismissed as irrelevant.
Although the speech or debate privilege embraces notions of the separation of powers among co-equal branches of government, its pri- 30 Brief for the United States at 32 n.64. For its first amendment argument the Government relied on Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) , in which the Supreme Court said:
The manifest function of the First Amendment in a representative government requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to express their views on issues of policy. 385 U.S. at 136. This case is discussed in the text accompanying notes 198-205 infra.
" ' Brief for the United States at 32. 32 The majority used the tenth amendment to buttress this argument: "The reservation of power for the states is .. . the import of the Tenth Amendment .. " 528 F.2d at 778. Yet it is clear today, as one commentator has noted, that "the Tenth Amendment does not shield the States nor their political subdivisions from the import of any authority affirmatively granted to the Federal Government." E. COR-WIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS To-DAY, 372-73 (1974) . Thus, if the federal government has the power to reach the conduct of the legislators, the tenth amendment does not take away that power simply because its exercise interferes with the state's own exercise of power.
[Vol. 68 mary message is that legislatures must be able to discharge their lawful responsibility in an atmosphere free from the threat of interference by other governmental units. A legislator in considering whether to support or oppose a proposed law must be free to reflect on the merits; he must not be deterred from advocating a position by the threat of prosecution by a hostile executive. The evil is the fact of deterrence; whether the threat emanates from the local or national executive makes no difference.
This threat to the legislature's independence is fundamentally inconsistent with the idea of legislative action reflected in the policy, purpose and history of the privilege and inherent in the words: "for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place." U.S. CONST. art. I § 6. Deterring a legislator from advancing a point of view, or influencing how he votes by requiring him to explain his motives before a grand jury is precisely the evil the speech or debate privilege intends to preventY' Protection of the first amendment was not enough because the amendment provides no privilege against giving testimony, even if that testimony involves inquiry into a legislator's motive for a particular vote or other legislative act.
3 4 Consequently, "in view of the purposes of the speech or debate privilege, its common law history, and the important role of the states in governing the country," the majority concluded that state legislators are protected in federal criminal prosecutions by a federal common law speech or debate privilege. agreed that the Illinois constitutional speech or debate clause was inapplicable in federal criminal prosecutions. But he disputed the panel majority's position that a legislator could claim a similar privilege under federal common law. Citing the same cases as the majority, he maintained that while state legislators are entitled to protection from liability for acts performed in furtherance of their legislative duties, the basis of that protection is not the federal speech or debate clause, but the common law doctrine of official immunity. 40 As for the evidentiary privilege, Judge Tone asserted that any privilege against disclosure must be "commensurate" with the underlying immunity from liability. But, where there is no immunity, it would be incongruous if not useless, to recognize an evidentiary privilege. Accordingly, whether the claimed privilege should be recognized as a development in the federal common law of evidence depends on whether there is an underlying immunity. 41 He then pointed out that the doctrine of official immunity has never been extended into the area of criminal liability:
Immunity from civil but not criminal liability has been regarded as sufficient to achieve the purpose of the doctrine of official immunity, which is to promote independence and fearless discharge of duty on the part of the protected Judge Tone maintained there was no reason for the federal judiciary to create such an immunity.
Nothing in our history or in the authorities relied upon by the court in this case suggests that there is a threat of federal executive interference with the independence of state legislatures that would warrant extending the judicially developed doctrine of official immunity beyond its traditional boundaries. Accordingly, I would hold that the state legislator's official immunity does not extend to liability under federal criminal statutes, and that he therefore has no commensurate official privilege against disclosure.
46
The Full Court Decision
The Government petitioned the court for a rehearing en banc. A majority 47 of the full court agreed with Judge Tone's position and voted to reverse the panel decision that the legislators were entitled to the protection of a federal common law evidentiary speech or debate privilege. 48 The court made special note, however, that the absence of a privilege has no relationship to the proof necessary to establish a crime involv43Id. 44 The relationship between the states and the federal government is not usually characterized as a separation of powers question. 
IMMUNITY
As the court of appeals panel decision makes clear, the decision to fashion a common law speech or debate privilege rather than apply the Illinois state constitutional privilege is dictated by the federal rules of evidence. In terms of practical effect on the legislators in Craig, however, there is little difference in result. Although there has been no definitive interpretation of the Illinois provision, it is worded almost identically to the federal constitutional provision and there is no reason to suppose that the Illinois courts would not closely follow the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal clause. Similarly, those same Supreme Court decisions which interpret the federal clause examine the origin of the concept of legislative privilege, and naturally provide an authoritative source for determining the parameters of a common law speech or debate privilege. 49 537 F.2d at 958-59 (emphasis in original). " There was less disagreement on the question of whether the suppression order should be reversed. Seven of the eight judges voted for reversal on that issue.
51judge Cummings adhered to his views in the panel majority opinion that the legislators were protected by a federal common law speech or debate privilege; but that Markert had waived his privilege by voluntarily testifying. Judge Swygert agreed with Judge Cummings on the existence of the privilege, but he felt the privilege had not been waived. 537 F.2d at 958-59. 5 1 Id. at 959. Chief judge Fairchild voted to reverse the suppression order, however, because he felt Markert had waived the privilege.
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On the other hand, of crucial importance to the legislators in Craig is the question of whether the "principles of common law" and relevant Supreme Court decisions dictate the application of a privilege based on the speech or debate clauses of the federal and state constitutions, or one based on the similar but narrower principles underlying the doctrine of official immunity. Developing an answer to this question involves an understanding of the English common law origin of the privilege, its Americanization as it was incorporated into the constitutional structure of the United States, and its relationship to the common law doctrine of official immunity.
Development of the Speech or Debate Privilege
The concept of legislative privilege in speech or debate was brought to the United States from England where it had developed as a consequence of the long struggle for political supremacy between the Crown and Parliament.
3
The English battle was two pronged. Parliament had to fight not only for freedom of speech and deliberation, but also for the right to initiate legislation. 5 4 Particularly during the reign of the Tudors and the Stuarts, the Crown resisted the growth of Parliamentary power. Throughout this period members of Parliament were subject to arrest, imprisonment or banishment from Parliament both for speeches which displeased the Crown and for "meddling with matters of state" which were considered to be the sole perogative of the Crown. 55 Parliament responded to actions taken against its members by passing legislation declaring that all prosecutions based on parliamentary proceedings were void," and by claim- " See e.g., Privilege of Parliament Act 1512, 4 Hen. VIII, c.8. This Act arose out of the prosecution of Richard Strode, a member of the House of Commons, for introducing legislation to regulate tin mining. Although the Act clearly stated that prosecutions of all present and future members of Parliament for legislative acts were void, the Kings Bench later held ing, in petitions to the Crown at the beginning of each Parliament, that freedom of speech was its "ancient and undoubted right and inheritance." 5 7 The Ehglish monarchs yielded to this assertion of privilege in varying degrees. Elizabeth I, for example, apparently acknowledged "freedom of speech," but tried to qualify the privilege by defining it as the privilege to say "aye or no."
58 James I was also willing to recognize the existence of a privilege, but not as a parliamentary right. He maintained that any parliamentary privilege was a matter of royal "toleration" and that the King was therefore free, should the need arise, to "punish any man's misdemeanors in Parliament, as well during their sitting as after." 59 However, by the middle of the seventeenth century, Parliament appears to have won the battle for a complete and meaningful privilege. The privilege was embodied formally into the English Bill of Rights in 1689,60 and its existence was never seriously questioned thereafter.
6
' Subsequently, as the battle for political supremacy between the Crown and Parliament was resolved, the privilege came to be asserted more often against fellow citizens than against the King.
62 In its origin, however, the privilege was clearly asserted to assure the independence of Parliament from the power of the Crown.
The English Parliament's concern for independence was, of course, well known to those that the Act was "private" and referred only to Strode. In 1667, Parliament formally declared the Act to be one of "general operation" declaring "ancient and necessary rights and privileges of Parliament." Veeder, supra note 54, at 132 n.5, 133-34.
-1 Veeder, supra note 54, at 132-33. Assertion of the privilege in the petition to the Crown was apparently begun in 1541. and importance of legislative privilege in the representative systems they sought to establish. A few years later, the drafters of the Federal Constitution did not even question the importance of legislative privilege. They adopted the federal speech or debate clause without dissent or significant discussion," merely altering the wording of the English privilege to fit the American tripartite governmental structure.
72
As Justice Frankfurter was later to note, the clause was simply a "reflection of political principles already established in the states.
73 Those "principles already established" were not, however, adopted wholesale from England. Although the colonial assemblies had, in some sense, begun their existence as "small parliaments," 74 the nature of the political structure in the colonial system, the physical isolation of the colonies from England, and the intense debate over the nature of government that raged throughout the colonial period 75 all combined to create uniquely American institutions in the colonies. 442, 443 (1924-25) . However, in view of the fact that the governmental structure of the states so closely parallels that of the federal government, it is probable that the constitutional clauses were intended to serve a separation of powers purpose as well. It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it to words spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in its application to written reports presented in that body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting, whether it is done vocally or by passing between the tellers. In short, to things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it.
Scope of the Privilege

'
On the basis of this interpretation, the Court went on to find that the members of the committee were immune from suit. While there might be "things done, in the one House or the other, of an extraordinary character, for which members who take part in the act may be held legally responsible," 92 on the facts presented, even though the committee was acting beyond its authority when it issued the order against the recalcitrant Mr. Kilbourn, 93 Because the Kilbourn Court explicitly expanded the protection of the federal clause beyond pure speech or debate to encompass protection for legislative acts, the case is frequently cited for the proposition that the clause must be construed liberally "to effectuate its purposes." 95 The holding of the Court was not as liberal as it might have been, however, for the Court refused to absolve the sergeant-atarms from liability for carrying out the committee order. As the order issued by the committee was "without authority," 9 6 the arrest of Kilbourn was illegal. Since the sergeant-at-arms was only a legislative functionary, not a legislator, he was unprotected by the legislative privilege and subject to suit for false imprisonment. This principle, that employees who implement the policies of legislators may be subject to suit even though the legislators themselves are not, at least arguably interferes with the independence of the legislature. 97 But it also helps protect the public against abuses of the legislature, without violating the literal wording of the constitutional privilege. 98 Thus, although Kilbourn, like Coffin, stressed the importance of the independence of the legislature, it effectively compromised on the full implications of this principle.
With Although the Supreme Court had never before considered whether the speech or debate clause granted any sort of immunity in situations in which criminal conduct was intertwined with legislative acts, 0 5 it had little difficulty in affirming he court of appeals' decision that Johnson's conviction on the conspiracy count could not stand. Its approach to the question was essentially historical. It noted that the primary impetus for the development of legislative privilege was not the fear of private civil suits such as that in Kilbourn, but fear of "intimidation" of the legislature by the "instigation of criminal charges against critical or disfavored legislators by the executive in a judicial forum."' 10 That same fear, according to the Court, formed the "predominate thrust of the Speech or Debate Clause" under the "American son is also cited for the proposition that the speech or debate clause must be construed liberally. system of separation of powers"' 1 7 in which the clause not only helps assure the independence of the legislature, but also reinforces the separation of the three branches of the government. 0 " In light of both its historical development and the concept of separation of powers, the Court concluded that the clause prevents not only prosecutions based on the content of a legislator's speech, but also those prosecutions which inquire into the legislator's motivation or intention for the performance of any legislative act.
The Government could not, therefore, maintain a case against Johnson which in essence charged him with improper motivation in his legislative conduct. The Government had inquired extensively into the wording of his speech, his personal knowledge of the facts included in it and the way in which the speech was prepared. In short, the conspiracy theory depended on a showing that the speech was made solely or primarily to serve private interests, and thatJohnson in making it was not acting in good faith, that is, that he did not prepare or deliver the speech in the way an ordinary Congressman prepares or delivers an ordinary speech. His prosecution on this basis violated both the letter and the spirit of the speech or debate clause. The Court was careful to note, however, that its holding was "limited to prosecutions involving circumstances such as those presented in this case ' 1ii in which the Government's inquiry into the Congressman's motive was not an "incidental" part of its case, but central to the proof of criminal conduct. The decision did not affect "prosecutions which though ... founded on a criminal statute of general application, do not draw in question the legislative acts of the defendant member of Congress or his motives for performing them.""' Thus, although Johnson was entitled to an evidentiary privilege insofar as the Government attempted to prove his participation in a conspiracy to defraud the government by reference to his legislative conduct, the Government was not precluded from showing criminal conduct on the basis of other evidence. Since the making of the speech was only part of the conspiracy charge, the Court remanded the case with instructions to allow the Government the opportunity to prove its case without the use of evidence "offensive to the Speech or
The Court in both Kilbourn and Johnson focused on the need to protect the independence of the legislature and gave the speech or debate clause a relatively expansive interpretation. In later cases, however, the Court has arguably cut back on the scope of the federal legislative privilege, focusing less on the need for legislative independence and more on the separation of powers concept which is the cornerstone of the American system of government. In United States v. Brewster," 3 for example, the Court stated:
[A]lthough the Speech or Debate Clause's historic roots are in English history, it must be interpreted in light of the American experience, and in the context of the American constitutional scheme of government rather than the -English parliamentary system. We should bear in mind that the English system differs from ours in that their Parliament is the supreme authority, not a coordinate branch. Our speech or debate privilege was designed to preserve legislative independence, not supremacy. Our task, therefore, is to apply the Clause in such a way as to insure the independence of the legislature without altering the historic balance of the three co-equal branches of Government."
4
Brewster involved the prosecution of a Congressman for accepting a bribe "in return for being influenced in his performance of official acts in respect to his action, vote, and decision on postage rate legislation which might at any time be pending before him in his official capacity."" ' His indictment had been dismissed by the district court which held that the speech or debate clause, "particularly in view of the interpretation given that Clause by the Supreme Court in Johnson," protected the Congressman against "any prosecution for alleged bribery to perform a legislative act." The Supreme Court disagreed. It first considered the general question of whether Congressmen could be prosecuted for taking bribes in exchange for promises relating to legislative acts. It concluded that neither the speech or debate clause itself nor prior judicial interpretations of the clause indicated that such a prosecution was impermissible. Johnson made clear that Congressmen may be prosecuted for crimes "provided that the Government's case does not rely on legislative acts or the motivation for legislative acts.''1 7 Other cases taught that legislative acts include only "those things generally said or done in the House or Senate in the performance of official duties and ... the motivation for those acts."" ' The Court distinguished sharply between these purely legislative activities and the "political" activities which Congressmen perform "in part because they have come to be expected by constituents, and because they are a means of developing continuing support for future elections .
'' 1 9 Although entirely "legitimate" and "appropriate," such activities, according to the Court, had never been protected by the speech or debate clause.
In no case has this Court ever treated the Clause as protecting all conduct relating to the legislative process. In every case thus far before this Court, the Speech or Debate Clause has been limited to an act which was clearly a part of the legislative process-the due functioning of the process.1 2 0
While a broader interpretation might be drawn out of the "flavor of the rhetoric and the sweep of the language" of prior decisions, neither the "precise Nwords" nor the "sense of those cases" mandated such an interpretation. 2 ' The grant of privilege under the clause was extremely broad even when the clause was interpreted narrowly, and the Court refused to expand it.
We would not think it sound or wise, simply out of an abundance of caution to doubly insure legislative independence, to extend the privilege beyond its intended scope, its literal language, "7 Id. at 512.
118Id.
119 Id.
' 20 Id. at 515-516. "Due functioning" of the legislative process has become the shorthand phrase for limiting the scope of legislative privilege to essentially voting, committee reports, hearings and speeches in Congress.
121 Id. at 516.
[Vol. 68 and its history, to include all things in any way related to the legislative process.1 22 The fact that Congress itself had the power to punish its members for misconduct did not persuade the Court that the judiciary should leave that task solely within congressional hands. The Court felt Congress to be "ill-equipped" to handle the essentially judicial tasks of investigation, trial and punishment of wrongdoers. 1 2 Furthermore, if Congress actively attempted to police and punish its members for conduct not directly related to the legislative process, the Court felt that individual legislators would be "at the mercy of an almost unbridled discretion of the charging body that functions at once as accuser, prosecutor, judge and jury from whose decision there is no established right of review.'
24 Independence of the legislature would be more likely to be compromised in such a situation than by a conventional criminal trial which provides rigorous procedural safeguards. Finally, the Court was not convinced that the independence of the legislature was actually threatened by the potential for executive harassment through the initiation of prosecutions for bribery. Historically, "the check and balance mechanism, buttressed by unfettered debate in an open society with a free press, has not encouraged abuses of power or tolerated them long when they arose."' 25 Public reaction to attempts to intimidate the legislature would limit the possibility of executive abuse of criminal statutes designed to assure honest government. But, even if some possibility of abuse existed, the Court felt it had to be balanced against the potential for harm to the system if Congressmen could not be prosecuted for bribery.
The purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is to protect the individual legislator, not simply for his own sake, but to preserve the independence and thereby the integrity of the legislative process. But financial abuses by way of bribes, perhaps even more than Executive power, would gravely undermine legislative integrity and defeat the right of the public to honest representation Having thus determined that prosecution for bribery was not forbidden simply because the charge "related" to the official conduct of a legislator, the Court went on to consider the specifics of the indictment brought against Brewster. It found that no inquiry into legislative acts was necessary in order for the Government to make out a prima facie case against the Congressman. The illegal act was the taking of a bribe, an act which could not possibly be characterized as legislative in nature. Furthermore, there was no need for the Government to show that Brewster had actually kept his promise to vote or to perform any other legislative act.
To sustain a conviction it is necessary to show that appellee solicited, received, or agreed to receive money with knowledge that the donor was paying him compensation for an official act. Inquiry into the legislative performance itself is not necessary; evidence of the Member's knowledge of the alleged briber's illicit reasons for paying the money is sufficient to carry the case to the jury 27 The Court dismissed with exceptional brevity the argument that any inquiry into an alleged bribe of a legislator for performing a legislative act was in essence an inquiry into the Congressman's motive and thus prohibited underJohnson.
That argument misconstrues the concept of motivation for legislative acts. The Speech or Debate Clause does not prohibit inquiry into illegal conduct simply because it has some nexus to legislative functions. In Johnson, the Court held that, on remand, Johnson could be retried on the conspiracy-to-defraud count, so long as evidence concerning his speech on the House floor was not admitted. The Court's opinion plainly implies that had the Government chosen to retry Johnson on that count, he could not have obtained immunity from prosecution by asserting that the matter being inquired into was related to the motivation for his House speech. But the Court has not retreated. Although it continues to maintain that the clause will be read "broadly to effectuate its purposes," it has also continued in the cases subsequent to Brewster carefully to circumscribe the area of activity protected by the privilege.
Gravel v. United States'
3 ' is particularly on point.
In the Gravel case, Senator Gravel had read most of the "Pentagon Papers," which were classified government documents, into the Congressional Record during a special midnight sub-committee meeting. Rodberg, the Senator's aide, was subpoened to testify before the grand jury concerning arrangements being made by the Senator to have the papers republished privately. He was also to be questioned regarding the Senator's source for the classified documents. Rodberg challenged the subpoena and Senator Gravel intervened, claiming that requiring Rodberg to testify on these matters would violate his speech or debate privilege. The Court agreed with the Senator insofar as he claimed the speech or debate clause to protect himself against civil or criminal liability for things said or done at the sub-committee hearing. The Court further agreed with Gravel that his aide was privileged with regard to legislative acts which would have been privileged if the Senator had personally performed them. It noted that it was literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern legislative process, with Congress almost constantly in session and matters of legislative concerns constantly proliferating, for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants; that the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the Members' performance that they must be treated as the latter's alter egos; and that if they are not so recognized, the central role of the Speech or Debate Clause-to prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciarywill inevitably be diminished and frustrated. Thus it refused to take a "literalistic"' 13 3 ap- (1973) . In Doe, suit was brought against members of Congress and the Public Printer and Superintendent of Documents for the publication of a libel in a congressional committee report which was distributed publicly. Members of the committee were immune from suit for the material included in their original report, since the making of the report was a legislative act. However, general publication and distribution of their report was not protected. Although the Court agreed that public dissemination of the information in congressional reports served an important function, it did not think such dissemination was an "integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Mem-
The clear import of these federal speech or debate clause cases, taken together, is that the legislative privilege embodied in the clause is not without limit. While mindful of the English and colonial common law origin of the clause, the Court has always been careful to interpret it in light of its American constitutional context. Thus, although it has recognized that the privilege is one method by which the framers of the Constitution attempted to ensure effective separation of powers, it has also recognized that the clause cannot be read so as to allow one of the three co-equal branches to achieve supremacy over the other two. In making the necessary compromises between these competing considerations, the Court has at times perhaps drawn arbitrary or even inconsistent lines between protected and unprotected activity.
139 But implicit in all its decisions is the recognition of the fact that in spite of the complexities of the modern legislative process and in spite of the need for legislative independence, legislative privilege is necessarily limited by the general constitutional scheme of government.
Comparison of the Constitutional Privilege with the Doctrine of Official Immunity
Legislators are not the only officials who enjoy a privilege from suit for those things "said or done ... in the exercise of the functions of [their] office."140 Other governmental officials have a similar, though narrower, privilege under the common law doctrine of official immunity. The principal focus of the doctrine of official immunity is the need to protect the independence of government officials. The Suhers participate in committee and House proceedings." Id. at 314.
[W]e cannot accept the proposition that in order to perform its legislative function Congress not only must at times consider and use actionable material but also must be free to disseminate it to the public at large, no matter how injurious to private reputation that material might be. Id. at 316. The Congressmen were immune from suit for the order of publication under the rationale of Kilbourn, but the printer who had carried out the unprotected order was held answerable for the libel. Id. at 571.
designed to aid in the effective functioning of government. The complexities and magnitude of governmental activity have become so great that there must of necessity be a delegation and redelegation of authority as to many functions, and we cannot say that these functions become less important simply because they are exercised by officers of lower rank in the executive hierarchy.
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Although strikingly similar to the speech or debate privilege in this emphasis on the need for government officials to be independent, official immunity is narrower than speech or debate protection in two important ways: some officials enjoy only a qualified immunity, and regardless of whether the immunity is absolute or qualified, it protects the official only against civil actions. The immunity is granted in order to ensure that these officials can and will carry out their duties. It is limited in recognition of the fact that an absolute immunity for all officials in all situations is both unnecessary to achieve the purposes of immunity and intolerable in light of the great harm that can be done to individuals by officials who abuse their power. As a check against this abuse the privilege of some officials is "conditioned on the good faith of the actor and the purpose of his conduct. Nor can this exemption of the judges from civil liability be affected by the motives with which their judicial acts are performed. The purity of their motives cannot in this way be the subject of judicial inquiry. Id. at 372.
In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896), the Court spelled out the purpose of the absolute immunity in detail:
[I]t is clear . . . that [a high ranking executive officer] cannot be held liable to a civil suit for damages on account of official communications made by him pursuant to an act of Congress, and in respect of matters within his authority, by reason of any personal motive that might be alleged to have prompted his action; for personal motives cannot be imputed to duly authorized official conduct. In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint. With respect to criminal liability, official immunity provides no testimonial privilege, and officials may be held criminally liable for their conduct. Most courts have felt that the lack of an exemption from criminal liability will not interfere with the policy behind the doctrine of official immunity. As one court explained in answer to a United States Attorney's claim of immunity to a mail fraud charge:
(C]ivil suits are easily adaptable for harassment purposes since any individual can institute a civil suit against another ....
Without immunity, judicial officials who dissatisfy certain people might easily be plagued by a rash of civil suits predicated on their official conduct. ... In contrast, this criminal prosecution was initiated by government officials in solemn performance of their duties and only after the defendants were indicted by a grand jury. Clearly, the potential for harassment . . . is not present in criminal prosecutions.I 53 Even judges, who enjoy exceptionally broad immunity, are not exempt from criminal liability. While it is still possible to find quotations to the effect that judges cannot be made criminally liable for their judicial acts,'
154 it may be doubted that such a rule was ever uniformly followed. For instance, in Braatelien v. United States,' 55 ajudge was convicted of "conspiracy to defraud the United States by corruptly administering or procuring the corrupt administration of an Act of Congress."' 5 6 Although the court noted that the crime charged was "distinct from his official acts"' 57 criminal conspiracy conviction was upheld against ajudge for his participation in a scheme under which he was paid to exercise his judicial power in favor of certain parties, without regard to the merits of their case. Evidence of his participation through his meetings with counsel, his scheduling of cases, the manner in which he presided at trial, and the fact that he rendered decisions in favor of defendants was all held admissible with no discussion of immunity.
More recently, in O'Shea v. Littleton, 0 the Supreme Court in strong dictum indicated that judges may be criminally liable for the exercise of their judicial duties in such a way as to wil-. fully deprive individuals of their constitutional rights. In O'Shea, suit was brought for injunctive relief against a state judge and magistrate alleged to be depriving plaintiffs, citizens of racially tense Cairo, Illinois, of their constitutional rights through discriminatory setting of bond, sentences, and jury fees in the criminal cases that came before them. Although refusing to grant the injunction,' 61 the Court made special note of the fact that state officials, including judges, were subject to criminal penalties under federal law for willful discrimination that deprives a citizen of his constitutional rights.' 62 In contrasting a judge's immunity from civil suit with his liability in criminal prosecutions, the Court observed: "the judicially fashioned doctrine of official immunity does not reach 'so far as to immunize criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress'.
' ' j ' Although dictum, the words cannot be dismissed as insignificant. The Court was taking special note of the fact, and issuing a clear warning to all state officials, that the doctrine of official immunity does not afford protection against criminal prosecutions.
The doctrine of official immunity is not, of 159 107 F.2d 834 (2nd Cir. 1938). 160 414 U.S. 488 (1974) . 161 The Court refused to grant relief on grounds that plaintiffs had failed to present an actual case or controversy since none of them was actually threatened by the alleged discriminatory conduct of the state officials.
162 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970) makes it a criminal offense to conspire to deprive a citizen of his constitutional rights.
16 414 U.S. at 503 (quotingGravel, 408 U.S. at 627).
course, limited only to judicial and executive officials. It has frequently been applied to officials who act in a legislative capacity, such as municipal aldermen, county and regional commissioners, and members of other legislative or quasi-legislative boards.1 64 But, because most state legislators have the protection of state constitutional speech or debate privilege, the concept of official immunity is rarely needed to guard their independence. In fact, one might assume that since immunity for legislators has so long been a part of the constitutional framework of American government, the doctrine of official immunity has been totally supplanted by the broader concept of speech or debate protection. Arguably, however, the doctrine of official immunity for legislators is still a viable alternative for determining the scope of a legislator's privilege in those situations in which a constitutional privilege is unavailable.
Recognition of a Federal Legislative Privilege Outside the Federal Constitutional Context
As noted earlier,' 65 a federal common law legislative privilege could be formulated along lines exactly parallel to the speech or debate privilege of the federal constitution, or it could be patterned after the more limited privilege of official immunity. 66 The argument that the latter approach is more appropriate is predicated in part on a number of Supreme Court cases dealing with state legislators and legislatures. Not only do these cases themselves suggest that state legislators retain only official immunity when no specific constitutional provision protects them, but a comparison of the Court's approach and language in these cases with that in the speech or debate clause cases also leads to the same conclusion.
There is only one Supreme Court case, Tenney v. Brandhove, 1 67 which deals directly with the subject of legislative privilege outside the context of a suit against federal congressmen. The case is confusing because the source of the legislative privilege which the Court found applicable is never specifically identified. committee. Brandhove, by means of a petition, attempted to convince the California legislature not to appropriate funds for the committee, charging that it had not only used him as a "tool" to smear a particular candidate for office, but had also conspired with the opposition candidate's campaign committee for the same purpose. The committee summoned 'Brandhove to testify and explain both his charges and certain conflicts with his previous testimony. Although Brandhove appeared before the committee, he refused to testify. He was prosecuted for contempt, but the prosecution was later dropped.
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He then brought suit against the committee under §1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 69 alleging that the hearing to which he had been called to testify had not been held for any legislative purpose, but to "intimidate ... silence . . . deter and prevent him from effectively exercising his constitutional rights of free speech and to petition the Legislature for redress of grievances . The Court answered its own question in the negative. It reviewed in detail the development of the concept of legislative privilege in England and the United States, focusing principally on the importance of the privilege in protecting the independence of the legislature, and the widespread adoption of the privilege at the state level. Noting that legislative privilege was a "tradition . . . well grounded in history and reason," the Court was convinced that Congress, itself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom, did not mean to limit the right of legislators to act in their traditional legislative sphere by subjecting them to civil suits under the general language of §1983.172 168 The jury failed to return a verdict and the committee did not pursue the prosecution. The Court then considered whether the Tenney committee had been acting within a sphere of traditional legislative activity. It first noted that the fact that Chairman Tenney might have had an "unworthy purpose" in calling Brandhove before the committee would not destroy his legislative privilege.
7 3 The privilege would have no value if a legislator were subject to liability based on speculations as to his motives for a particular act. Motive was irrelevant as long as the legislator was acting within the traditional legislative sphere. Furthermore, in reviewing the actions of the Tenney committee, the Court noted that legislative investigations are "an established part of representative government,"' 74 and on the facts before it there appeared to be substantial reason for the committee to have recalled Mr. Brandhove, regardless of the personal motives of the Chairman.
Legislative committees have been charged with losing sight of their duty of disinterestedness. In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed to legislative conduct and are as readily believed. Courts are not the place for such controversies. Self-discipline and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting such abuses. The courts should not go beyond the narrow confines of determining that a committee's inquiry may be fairly deemed within its province. To find that a committee's investigation has exceeded the bounds of legislative power it must be obvious that there was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive. The present case does not present such a situation. Brandhove indicated that evidence previously given by him to the committee was false, and he raised serious charges concerning the work of a committee investigating a problem within legislative concern. The Committee was entitled to assert a right to call the plaintiff before it and examine him. v. McMillan,'9 a case in which the Court had to deal specifically with the parameters of both the speech or debate privilege and official immunity, the court used Tenney only in its discussion of official immunity.
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One might argue, however, that even if the Court has "aligned" Tenney with its official immunity cases, such an alignment is not necessarily dispositive of the issue of a legislator's criminal liability. Official immunity is, after all, a flexible doctrine which varies in scope with the type of official involved. When applied to legislators it might, therefore, be broad enough to give them immunity from civil and criminal liability rather than just the traditional civil immunity granted to judicial and executive officials. Outside the constitutional context, where balance of power considerations must be given considerable weight, there is no apparent reason for granting such significantly broader immunity to legislators, however. The purpose of official immunity is to safeguard the independence of the official. That purpose is adequately served by limiting the possibility of civil suits. Criminal prosecutions, regardless of the official accused, simply do not provide the same "potential for harassment" ' 1 9 2 as civil suits. In O'Shea v. Littleton, 193 the Supreme Court gave some indication that it not only recognizes an official immunity for state legislators which is different from speech or debate protection, but also that, at least for purposes of a federal criminal prosecution, it views all forms of official immunity as equal. O'Shea, it will be remembered, was a suit for injunctive relief against a state judge and magistrate in which the Court, albeit in dictum, went out of its way to warn that state officials may be criminally liable for exercise of their official duties in such 90 412 U.S. 306 (1973). This case is also discussed in note 138 supra. 191 In Doe, both a Congressman and the government printer were sued for publication of a libel in a committee report. The Court discussed the Congressman's immunity under the speech or debate clause. It dealt with the printer's immunity under the doctrine of official immunity. Tenney was cited only in the section of the case dealing with the printer's immunity. It was cited for three specific propositions: 1) "official immunity has been held applicable to officials of the Legislative Branch," 412 U.S. at 319 n.13; 2) the scope of the official immunity conferred is not the same for all officials, id. at 319; 3) the scope of immunity is tied to the range of official authority, id. at 320. the Georgia House, after a hearing at which Bond testified, concluded that he could not honestly take either the oath of office required by the Georgia constitution or the oath to support the Constitution of the United States. The clerk refused to administer either oath and the House refused to seat him. Bond sued for in-196 383 U.S. at 180. 197 Similarly, since on the facts the Tenney committee's conduct was protected under the narrowest view of official immunity (the committee was clearly engaged in legislative business and there was ample evidence of a legislative purpose in recalling Brandhove to explain his prior testimony), there was no need to distinguish between any broader speech or debate privilege and the doctrine of official immunity.
385 U.S. 116 (1966).
199 He was subsequently re-elected in a special election held to fill the vacancy caused by the House's refusal to seat him. He was re-elected in the regular November, 1966 election as well. Id. at 128. 200 The statements are reproduced in the Court's opinion. Id. at 121-22.
junctive relief under §1983201 against the speaker and speaker pro-tem, certain officers of the House, and several members as representatives of the membership of the entire body.
The state argued that the Georgia constitution specified the qualifications for the office of state legislator, that the oath provisions constituted part of those qualifications, and that the House had the power to "look beyond the plain meaning of the oath provisions . . . to [deter- mine] whether a given Representative may take the oath with sincerity.
' 2 0 2 Although admitting that it could not exclude a duly elected representative on racial or other clearly unconstitutional grounds, the state argued that the oath requirement was not unconstitutional and, therefore, "there should be no judicial review of the legislature's power to judge whether a prospective member may conscientiously take the oath required by the State and Federal Constitutions.1 2 0 3 Bond, on the other hand, maintained that the judgment of the House that he could not honestly take the oaths of office violated his first amendment rights. The Supreme Court agreed that the legislature had infringed Bond's right to free speech:
[W]e do not quarrel with the State's contention that the oath provisions of the United States and Georgia Constitutions do not violate the First Amendment. But this requirement does not authorize a majority of state legislators to test the sincerity with which another duly elected legislator can swear to uphold the Constitution. Bond's statements did not violate any law. Although the state could require an oath of loyalty, that oath could not be used to "[limit] its legislators' capacity to discuss their views of local or national policy. ' 205 Nowhere in the opinion did the Court mention the holding of Tenney that under §1983 Congress did not extinguish the immunity of legislators acting in their traditional sphere of legislative activity. Nor did it distinguish the two cases on the basis that Brandhove had sued for damages and Bond was asking for injunctive relief. by totally ignoring the question of the immunity of the Georgia legislators, the Court implicitly indicated that whatever legislative privilege state legislators enjoy in federal court, it is considerably more limited than speech or debate protection.
Another indication thatBond may be cited for such a proposition is the failure of the Powell Court to distinguish or even mention Bond in connection with the question of legislative privilege. Since it cited Bond in regard to other matters, 210 case in which injunctive relief was asked in order to protect federal rights. In such a case, according to the court, the federal courts have the power to review the actions of the legislature and to grant appropriate relief. That power cannot be limited by a claim of legislative privilege. Of course the Supreme Court has never been as explicit as the Fourth Circuit on this issue. But the fact that it has granted injunctive relief against state legislatures and their members with no discussion of legislative privilege when legislative privilege stands out as a crucial issue tempted to expand the coverage of its laws against champerty, barratry and maintenance to include the activities of civil rights organizations within the state. The particular committee cited in Jordan was originally established to oversee "the laws of the Commonwealth relating to the administration of justice ... particularly those relating to the statutorily redefined offenses of champerty, maintenance, etc .... "Id. at 602. Its activities were later expanded to cover legal ethics and the unauthorized practice of law. Plaintiffs alleged that the committee by use of its investigatory power was interfering with their efforts as lawyers to eliminate segregation. 214 18 U.S.C. § § 241, 242 (1970). 215 323 F.2d at 601.
in similar cases at the federal congressional level is a strong indication that the Court does not recognize a similar privilege at both levels.
CONCLUSION
A Brief Return to the Craig Opinion
The dilemma facing the Seventh Circuit in Craig was to determine from both the history of legislative privilege and the relevant Supreme Court decisions whether state legislators accused of violating federal criminal laws enjoy some form of federal common law privilege. Obviously, neither history nor Supreme Court decisions provide clear guidance, and more than one conclusion can be, and was, drawn from the same source material. However, the decision of the full court 2 7 seems to reflect more accurately both the history of legislative privilege and the principles articulated by the Supreme Court than does the earlier panel decision.
The principal difference between the panel majority and the full court majority opinions is one of emphasis. The panel majority relied almost exclusively on the broad language of the speech or debate clause cases, and it stressed the need for legislative independence at all levels of government. It argued that in a government of limited powers -with those powers not specifically granted the federal government reserved to the states under the tenth amendment-the states had an essential role to play in the operation of the governmental system. Fearing that the independence of the state legislatures would be compromised if the federal government could threaten state legislators with criminal liability for their legislative acts, the panel considered a broad legislative privilege, equivalent to the speech or debate clause, to be necessary in order to eliminate that potential threat.
The problem with the panel's singular emphasis on independence is that it ignores both the implications of the supremacy clause and the separation of powers function served by the speech or debate clause at the federal level. The concept of legislative privilege developed as a consequence of the competition for power be-217 All references to the full court decision in this section specifically emcompass both Judge Tone's concurrence in the panel decision and the full court opinion on rehearing. The latter essentially adopted the former.
tween the executive and legislative sections of government. In England, it arose in the battle for supremacy between the Crown and Parliament. In the United States, the principle was adapted to ensure the separation and balance of power between two equal and clearly competing branches of the federal government. In both cases it was principally the power of the competing executive branch that the privilege was designed to curb.
Within any federal system there is, of course, potential for competition between the separate levels of government, just as various branches at the same level may compete for power. But under the Constitution when authority is specifically delegated to the federal government, the supremacy clause resolves the issue of competition for power. Concern for the independence of a state legislature, on the other hand, involves the relationship within the state government between legislative and executive branches, a tension properly controlled by state speech or debate privileges. Therefore, the question that should be asked in federal prosecutions of state legislators is not whether the independence of a state legislature may in some way be affected, but whether the federal government has the authority to act. Whatever questions may once have been raised with respect to the federal government's authority to act in matters of criminal law enforcement, that federal power is now clearly established under the commerce clause" ' and other explicit grants of authority such as the power to establish the post office.
9 Both the Hobbs Act and the Mail Fraud Statute under which the legislators in Craig were prosecuted have been specifically upheld against constitutional attack. Both these statutes have also been construed to reach the illegal activities of state officials, 221 and there is no reason why the activities of state legislators alone should be exempted.
In contrast to the panel decision, the full court decision in Craig focuses not only on the separation of powers function of the speech or debate privilege, but also on the limitations of both that privilege and the doctrine of official immunity. It implicitly recognizes that independence is not the sole factor to be considered in determining the nature of a legislator's privilege. Almost all government officials enjoy some sort of privilege from suit premised on their need for independence in order to carry out their duties. But not all officials are equally immune. The differences in protection are related both to the nature of the particular official'sjob and to the requirements of the constitutional system, requirements which vary when the issue is not intra-federal power, but federalstate relations.
The common law privileges. Its tone recalls Wigmore's reflections on the public's right to "everyman's evidence. ' "222
The investigation of truth and the enforcement of testimonial duty demand the restriction, not the expansion, of... privileges. They should be recognized only within the narrowest limits required by principle. Every step beyond these limits helps to provide, without any real necessity, an obstacle to the administration of justice .
23
This same philosophy is implicit in the decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with legislative privilege, if one considers the entire spectrum of cases in which the Court has dealt, directly or indirectly, with the issue. The Court has not extended the privilege "beyond its intended scope.
1 2 24 Where there is no real necessity for an expansive interpretation of privilege, none has been given. Similarly, the final decision of the court in Craig recognizes that in the context of federal criminal prosecutions of state legislators there is no necessity for an expansive interpretation of legislative privilege, and none should be given. 
THE RIGHT OF AUTONOMY: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIT TO PLENARY FEDERAL POWER
As every United States citizen ought surely to be aware, government in this country functions through two entities, the state and federal governments. Since these institutions are by definition separate forms, resisting ready integration, those regions where they interface have been in continuous flux from before the birth of the Constitution.' The struggle between them has resulted in a steady erosion of the position of the state vis-a-vis the national government as an independent political body.
2 Indeed, since the beginning of the Republic, an erratic but steady decline in the power of the states has been recognized by the courts. 3 So complete is this decline that the classic expression of the structure of state-national relations, the tenth amendment, has been shorn of all substance and called a mere "truism" . 4 Yet, to consider the shift of power as ended save for the eventual dismantlement of state governmental machinery, is to overlook both the vitality of the Constitution as a source of preservation of state independence and the ability of the Supreme Court to invigorate it. While the struggle for power has long since been decided, there now remains the need to deal with the state's right to autonomy 5 upon which the Constitution was amend. X.
5
The labeling of this right as one of autonomy was arbitrarily selected by the author to express the nature of the purpose which it serves in the federal system. The word was used in a related context by Justice Field in Ex parte Virginia: based and which is becoming increasingly explicit in the decisions of the Supreme Court.
I. HISTORY OF STATE-NATIONAL CONFRONTA-TION OVER POWER
While the tenth amendment is not the only marker in the Constitution concerning the relationship of state and national power, with rare exceptions 6 its language has provided the paradigm of judicial analysis. Assuming that power was reserved to the states or people unless a delegation by either of those groups could be found in the Constitution, 7 the crucial question, traditionally, was one of defining the word "power". One commentator has interpreted the tenth amendment to mean:
The States of course possess every power that government has ever anywhere exercised, except only those powers which their own constitutions or the Constitution of the United States explicitly or by plain inference withhold. They are the ordinary governments of the country; the federal government is its instrument only for particular purposes. These pre-Civil War decisions expanded federal power at the expense of the state, but only insofar as the state partook of activities that might interfere with those which had been delegated to the national government. Within their own realm, the states remained independent.' 5 While the Civil War answered whether the Constitution was a dissolvable compact, its progeny-the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments-posed grave questions as to the ordering of power between the state and national governments. Now the federal govern-9 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCulloch, the Supreme Court found the states to be incapable under the Constitution to tax property owned by the national government.
10 Congress shall have Power.. to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for the carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. U.S. CO ST. art I, § 8. ment became the guarantor of certain rights of the people against state government intrusion or interference. Unquestionably, federal power had been expanded at the cost of the states.1 6 What remained to be determined was how far that expansion reached into the states.1 7 Also during this period, the power of the state to affect outgoing enterprises and rights continued to be scrutinized and regulated. The classic example of the reach of federal power is that which traces interstate commerce. While early restrictive distinctions denied the application of federal power to private actions,' 8 the restrictions proved to be little more than bothersome delaying actions, only postponing federal action. State power as a bar proved to be a more effective limitation. 23 the national government was found to be capable of taxing certain functions which the state had assumed in the exercise of its police power. The symmetrical nature of the tax system was breaking down, as the needs of the national government began to take precedence.
As to those powers and prerogatives of the state which were internal in application, primarily the police power and its concern for the health and safety of its citizens, the entry offered to the national government by the Civil War Amendments was bitterly fought and restrictively perceived. While the Supreme Court in The Slaughterhouse Cases 24 recognized the goals and reasoning of those amendments, it refused to invigorate them. 25 Indeed, in those rare instances where the Court did act, 2 " the outcry was loud and fierce. Similarly, attempts to reach the criminal systems of the states via incorporation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment due process provision were soundly defeated. When the electric chair was first introduced, attempts were made to attack it as a cruel and unusual punishment. The Court rejected such an approach, holding that:
The Fourteenth Amendment did not radically change the whole theory of the relations of the state and Federal governments to each other, and of both governments to the people."
An attempt to incorporate the right against selfincrimination reached a like fate. 28 Indeed, in South Carolina v. United States, 29 the Court went so far as to limit the federal power to intervene within a state to the provisions of a single constitutional clause,
[t]he Constitution provides that "the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government," Art. IV, 24 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 2 The dissent clearly acknowledged the course the future would eventually take:
It [the power via the war amendments] is necessary to enable the government of the Nation to secure everyone within its jurisdiction the rights and privileges enumerated, which, according to the plainest considerations of reason and justice and the fundamental principles of the social compact, all are entitled to enjoy. Without such authority any government claiming to be national is glaringly defective. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
26 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). Virginia had a statute requiring its judges to venire only responsible men. One state judge had used this formulation to eliminate all blacks. In this case, the Supreme Court upheld federal intervention. sec. 4. That expresses the full limit of National control over the internal affairs of a State. The last significant attempt to reject the expanded constitutional power of the national government came with the "infamous ' 3 1 striking down of a dozen pieces of New Deal legislation. That process came abruptly to an end in 1937, however, and the question of the distribution of power between the federal and state governments began to be resolved. The substantive impact of the tenth amendment did not long survive the Court's turnabout. By 1941, the amendment reached "truism" status, 2 2 as the Supreme Court finally decided that a plenary power of the national government could not be buffered or moderated by any powers inherent in the states.
33
There were no such powers. The Supreme Court for the first time intruded in a state criminal proceeding in Powell v. Alabama. 34 The states' ability to mold and determine their own criminal procedure began to erode at a quickening pace in the years that followed. The same day that an attempt to extend the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the states was defeated,-a confession accepted by a state supreme court 6 was thrown out by the United States Supreme Court as being coercively obtained in violation of the due process provision of the fourteenth amendment.3 7 As state criminal proceedings became more encumbered with federal rights to protect, they became more subject to federal review as to those rights. 46 were held to apply to the states.
The Court has gone beyond the state's criminal processes and has extended federal power to reach the state's power to educate its citizens,4 provide recreation ,48 establish political subdivisions 49 and even constitute its own legislature. 50 These extensions, however, were not based on the plenary power of the federal government but on the oversight responsibilities given it by the Civil War Amendments. As more and more constitutional safeguards were being grafted onto the state criminal process, there arose the notion that these rights required a federal forum of review to ensure their exercise and enforcement." The basic ra-tionale was that a federal right was being contested and that the states, which had been reluctant to introduce these safeguards without a constitutional mandate, would not be reliable in ensuring their proper breadth. The result was the judicial extension of habeas corpus review in federal court of state court constitutional determinations .52
The internal structure of the state had likewise always been free from federal oversight. Judicial attacks based on the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution 3 were rebuffed on the premise that the power to carry out the guarantee of the section was legislative in nature . 56 Three years later, federal mandates concerning procedures to be followed in the registration of the electorate by the states were upheld by the Supreme Court in Louisiana v. United States 7 and South Carolina v. Katzenbach ." Indeed, the oversight processes validated in Katzenbach relegated the state to the status oT' a mere administrative unit of the national government for purposes of voter registration, as the ministerial control of the United States Justice Department was broad in scope, scrupulous in detail, and affirmative in nature.
These decisions mark the highwater crest of national manipulation of state institutions. To a large extent, the intrusion of federal policy and power into these reaches was a response to the inability of the state institutions to shift as quickly as national expectations. 9 The result was an abiding distrust in the competence of the states to act as they "ought" and the destruc- tion of the ability of the states to develop their own ordering of priorities . 60 The powers relating to sovereignty-all the power which made an institution a state-have thus come to lodge within the national government. The states, lacking all effective substantive power, can be seen as mere political sub-units of the national government. If transformation of the federal national government into a unitary national government has not yet occurred, the reason is not lack of power, but lack of need or desire to exercise that power."
There is no longer any struggle between the state and national governments as to where the powers lie. The delegated powers of the federal government have become the functional equivalent of all the powers:
There are today few, if any, governmental functions performed by the states that are not subject either to the direct control of the national government or to the possibility of preemption by the national government. The concept of separate sovereignties within this country is largely a matter of history. 
BEANEY, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE SOCIETY
(1959).)
61 Such a change may indeed be what is required in order for the United States to respond to the requirements and needs of its citizens and the exigencies generated by the international community. Yet, insofar as our Constitution is the law from which our system emanates and since its integrity is crucial for the continuing integrity of the system, the uses to which it is put must remain in harmony with the spirit of the document. For the states to become only integrated components within a master system, without character of their own, a constitutional amendment should be required, not judicial fiat or legerdemain. 6 4 Sovereignty is two-pronged in nature. It consists of power and discretion. Power allows the sovereign to effectuate its wishes with as little external interference as possible. Discretion is the sovereign's ability to order its priorities, to determine the manner in which it will achieve them, and to compose the nature of its own infrastructure. 65 The battles which have taken place between the state and federal governments have been 6' Discretion is the internal orientation of the state. Thus, within constitutional parameters, the state has the discretion to determine the rank order and distribution of its resources, e.g. whether it will pursue an expansive highway building program or pursue a policy of fiscal restraint, or indeed, whether it will have any policies at all. Moreover, discretion reaches the internal structure of the state, as the state is the determiner of how it will organize itself. However, the second of the components which comprise state sovereignty -discretionhas not been destroyed. Nothing in the passing of power (except, perhaps, its coercive potential) 70 has served to strip the states of their discretion. Power is not necessary to its exercise, for discretion is self-sufficient, representing the core of the spirit of the institution; it will decide in what manner it will act, unless forced to do otherwise. Clearly, the states will decide in what manner they ought to act. This prerogative is all that remains from their former sovereign status. Yet it does remain, and while, like the prerogatives of the national government, it must conform to certain constitutional requirements, it, too, is constitutional in stature and may act to protect itself, much like the right of privacy serves to insulate the prerogatives of the individual. (1934) . That the right to autonomy is of constitutional dimension ought to be without challenge. The states formed the Constitution. The states and the people ratified and accepted the Constitution. Its existence was for the states' protection, not their extermination. The constitutional protections for and concerning the States (art. IV); the constitutional prohibitions against the states (art. I. § 10); and the nature and responsibilities necessitated in choosing the legislative (art. I, § 4 and amend. XVII) and the executive (art. II, § 1) all require that the states retain the ability to exercise their discretion in order to achieve or not achieve certain ends.
In If taken to extreme, the right to autonomy could just as easily destroy the national government as the national government is currently eviscerating the states. 76 Thus, it is a right which must weigh against other rights and powers found in the Constitution and does not provide the states with an absolute protection. The right of autonomy for the states does offer them, however, the constitutionally required opportunity to preserve themselves.
ceiling on the benefits it distributed through its AFDC program was upheld by the Supreme Court. Justice Stewart's opinion for the majority characterized the Maryland action as a state's attempt "to reconcile the demands of its needy citizens with the finite resources available to meet those demands." Id. at 472. This ability to make such determinations, free from unwarranted external intervention is the heart of the discretion, the autonomy, of the states. Dandridge also provides an example of the constitutional limits of the right to autonomy. For, as the dissent vigorously argues, the manner in which the state exercised its discretion was a violation of the equal protection, required by the fourteenth amendment. 
Taxation Cases
Certainly if all the provisions of our Constitution which limit the power of the Federal government and reserve other power to the States are to mean anything, they mean at least that the States have the power to pass laws and amend their constitutions without first sending their officials hundred of miles away to beg Federal authorities to approve them. 77 The taxing power is one which is concurrently held by the state and national governments. 78 It retains within it the greatest potential of all governmental powers for constructive and destructive impact.79 In a non-unitary system, such as ours, the ability of one government to tax the corpus of the other represents a tremendous threat to the balance upon which that system must be based. The traditional judicial response when one institution attempted to tax an aspect of another was to disallow the tax as a threat to sovereign immunity, although nothing explicitly within the Constitution required this. Thus, states were not allowed to tax any aspect of the federal government. 1 so long as the tax did not discriminate against or otherwise unfavorably single out the state enterprise.
Chief Justice Stone wrote the "plurality" opinion, in which Justices Reed, Murphy, and Burton concurred. While likewise upholding the validity of the tax as applied to New York, the Chief Justice was not satisfied that the only constitutionally mandated limit on the federal taxing power was that it not discriminate against the state. He reasoned that there were activities and functions which were unique to the state because of its status as a sovereign and which were outside the reach of the federal power:
If we are to treat as invalid, because discriminatory, a tax on State activities and State owned property that partake of uniqueness from the point-of-view of intergovernmental relations, it is plain that the invalidity is due wholly to the fact that it is a State which is being taxed so as to unduly infringe, in some manner, the performance of its functions as a government which the Constitution recognizes as sovereign. 92 (Emphasis added)
'9 Justice Jackson did not participate. 90 Though it was presented as the majority opinion, only one other Justice, Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurred in it and even he wrote a separate opinion. It is more aptly considered a "consensus" opinion.
91 Id. at 581-82. 92 Id. at 588.
The sale of mineral water is not this type of governmental function, according to Justice Stone, but he expressed his doubts as to the constitutionality of federal taxes on "the State's capitol, its State-house, its public school houses, public parks, or its revenues from taxes or school lands. ' 93 The important thing, according to Justice Stone, was to limit the potential deleterious impact of federal taxation on state projects, thus protecting state sovereignty without imposing too great a cost upon the federal government in lost revenue. 94 In dissent, Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, also rejected the view that the federal tax power is plenary when not discriminatory. For Justice Douglas, South Carolina was wrongly decided. Rather, the appropriate test should focus on whether the activity is within the state's power to initiate or operate. If so, it should be beyond the reach of the federal tax power. The mere fact that a state's activity was one in which it attempted to make a profit or was in a field formally reserved for private enterprise ought not to have any bearing upon the status of the state's tax immunity. Indeed, Justice Douglas viewed the immunity as a crucial factor in the continued maintenance of the federal system: "The Constitution is a compact between sovereigns."
95 Consequently, to let one sovereign tax the other's activities and projects is to relegate the states to a servile status vis-a-vis the national government.
They [the states) become subject to interference and control both in the functions which they [T]he two governments, National and state, are each to exercise their power so as not to interfere with the free and full exercise by the other of its powers. 91326 U.S. at 592.
exercise and the methods they employ. They must pay the federal government for the privilege of exercising the powers of sovereignty guaranteed them by the Constitution. 96 Thus, in New York v. United States, a majority of the Supreme Court 97 found, so far as the taxing power of the federal government was concerned, that the status of the states as sovereigns, implicit and interwoven within the text of the Constitution, did operate to make a substantive limit to that power. This majority split over both the substance of that power, in general, and as applied to facts of the case. Beyond the broad rule suggested by Justice Douglas and the off-hand-examples of Chief Justice Stone, little was said to explain the nature or source of this implied right. Thus, wrapped in shadowy ambiguities and acknowledged only by its absence, the right of autonomy first appeared.
The Commerce Power
Eighteen years later, in Maryland v. Wirtz, "s an attempt was made to utilize the rough concepts of state sovereignty outlined in New York to establish a buffer against the otherwise plenary power of the federal government concerning interstate commerce. Congress had amended the Fair Labor Standards Act, concerning minimum wages and overtime benefits, so that its provisions would reach any employee at a state school or hospital, who was in a nonexecutive, administrative or professional position. On its face, the Act served only to provide mandatory guidelines for employee treatment, yet it actually went far in directing the distribution of limited state funds.
9 9 This time, a sixman majority found there was no implied right protecting the states, at least insofar as the interstate commerce power was concerned.' (1946) . In Case, the price of timber had been given a ceiling by the administrator under the Emergency Price Control Act during World War II to control product costs. The state of Washington had certain timberlands set aside to provide income for its schools. It sold at auction some of these lands for a price greater than that allowed under the Act. The Supreme Court upheld the administrator and enjoined the sale. The Act had been passed pursuant to the Congress' war power. Its approval is illustrative of the Court's bending to the will of the national government in times of emergency. See also, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) . Being concerned with the war power, it cannot be dispositive on the reach of the commerce power vis-a-vis the state's right to autonomy. 104 The majority did, however, find the time to quibble over Justice Douglas's interpretation of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Justice Douglas's syllogism was [Vol. 68 ing of the "majority" in that case was Justice Douglas' keystone. He found that the threat of extinction to state governments through unbridled use of the commerce power had implication for the states every bit as lethal as the tax power had had in New York.
Federal Oversight
Abstention by federal courts is a judicial construct first given clear form in This principle expanded somewhat in the years that followed, so that it reached not only constitutional questions before state attempts at limitation and construction, but also "unseemly conflict between the sovereignties" and actions which might unduly hinder state functions. This expansion has not continued unchecked in the recent past, however, as the current cases fit less and less easily into the flow of the past. With the addition of Chief Justice Burger in 1969 and Justice Blackmun to the Supreme Court in 1970,108 the Court has moved with rapidity', for an institution so akin to glacial flow, to limit the encroachment of the national government upon the states, and, if possible, reverse it.
The new Court acted first in the area which was least dangerous or controversial, the judicial construct of abstention. In doing so, it was able to reaffirm the integrity of the statejudicial forums, avoid any direct Constitutional questions as to the status of the states, and restore, somewhat, the state power to decide questions of criminal law. Thus, in its second term, the Burger court established the principle of federalism abstention.
In Younger v. Harris,' 0 9 the defendant had been indicted for violation of the state Criminal Syndicalism Act. Before the charge went to trial, Harris sued in federal court to have the act stricken down as unconstitutional. The three-judge court struck down the act as vague and overbroad. The Supreme Court reversed, eight to one, without reaching the merits. The Court found that the history of the country was one based on a belief in the federal system. Such a belief specifically excluded federal interference with state criminal prosecutions except as the state government showed itself to be incapable oflacting as it was supposed to. To reinforce the belief that a state criminal proceeding was a just and fitting forum, the Supreme Court limited federal court interference in a state criminal prosecution to cases involving unjustified state harassment or irreparable injury. The heart of this policy was the statenational relationship of federalism, characterized as: a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the states.
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Even Justice Douglas, the only dissenter, does not dispute the nature of the federal relationship. However, particularly in light of his fierce advancement of the meaning of the first amendment safeguards,"' he continued to distrust the states' ability and desire to exercise and provide those safeguards for their citizens. Federalism abstention was, initially, an instrument primarily for the preservation of the integrity of the state's criminal judicial system. Two years later, the reach of this federalism was extended to the executive and the legislative branches. Pennsylvania had passed a law allowing private, sectarian schools to be reimbursed for certain secular educational functions performed by them. This statute was struck down by the Supreme Court as being violative of the first amendment in Lemon v. Kurtzman (I).113 Following that decision, the state reimbursed those schools for the secular functions they had performed prior to the Supreme Court's decision. The plaintiffs attacked this action as being violative of the first amendment. The Supreme Court upheld the state action in Lemon v. Kurtzman (II). 114 Among the plaintiffs attacks was that there could be no justified reliance upon the statute until validated by the courts. This argument was peremptorily rejected. A sovereign government must act as if it is sovereign." ' for almost every action of state government before it could be effectuated. To an extent, this merely is a rephrasing of the presumption of contsitutionality which attaches to all challenged state laws and actions. But the Court was extending the concepts of federalism and state autonomy from mere judicial abstention in criminal matters. The record of the Supreme Court in the 1970's is one of a continuing expansion of the recognition of federalism and its substantive concerns.
The ability of the federal courts to safeguard federal constitutional rights as against the states was limited severely again, when the Supreme Court decided that habeas corpus review by the federal courts did not include questions of fourth amendment search and seizure." 6 The rationale for this decision was a balancing test of competing interests. While the case seems to be primarily an exposition on the weaknesses of the exclusionary rule, the Court did not ultimately deal with that issue' 7 and found that the fourth amendment interests were outweighed by the harm habeas corpus review caused the states' criminal justice system."" The result is premised on the ability and willingness of the state to provide a full and fair hearing for the defendant. Since the provisions of the fourth amendment are constitutional in nature, they can only be outweighed by interests which are constitutional in quality. The counter-balance, in this case, is the integrity of the state judicial system. The federalism concerns first articulated in Younger have now attained constitutional dimensions.
The question might be raised as to how these abstention and habeas corpus cases relate to a state's right to autonomy. A state's right to autonomy is no more plenary than any federal power, as each retains substantive limits: due process or equal protection, or an affirmative constitutional prohibition, express or implied, to name but a few. The integrity of the state's administrative apparatus, the ways and means that it creates, discharges, and upholds its laws, are critical to its operation as a sovereign entity. Any argument that such operations could be completely free of federal oversight disappeared with the passage of the Civil War Amendments. While those amendments did [Vol. 68 AUTONOMY not truncate the states' power, they did form buffers and guidelines for its use. The balance between the power of the federal government to enforce those amendments within the states' operations and the ability of the states to view the guidelines without federal interference has shifted markedly. In part, this has been the result of the loss of state hostility to many of the procedures and processes made mandatory. But the substantive shift has been toward a greater belief in the ability of the state to govern itself and the superfluous nature of federal oversight."' While these may appear trivial as to the question of an implied constitutional right, these cases are symptomatic of a growing realization on the part of the Supreme Court that the state does have a substantive right of autonomy, embedded within the fabric of the Constitution. It is a power which not only constitutes a material bumper to the exercise of federal power but also may act to channel the process of the implementation of individual rights, though not the substance of those rights. 20 
National League of Cities v. Usery
The most dramatic step toward recognition of the state right of autonomy by the Supreme Court has been the striking down of a federal statute based upon the exercise of the commerce power for its undue interference with "the States qua states". It is primarily a resuscitation of the plurality position by Chief Justice Stone in New York v. United States,' 2 ' but where that decision recognized the right but upheld the law, this one both recognizes the right and provides it with some bite.
The federal Fair Labor Standards Act, whose application to certain state employees had been upheld by the Court in Maryland v. Wirtz' 2 was 9 Id. at 493. 120 It is important to recognize that the right of autonomy for the state cannot limit the requirements of the Civil War Amendments. Those amendments concern the rights of individual people. Autonomy concerns the relationship of the state and national government. The amendments were passed to provide substantive limits on the states. The federal government may become involved by determining the means of ensuring those rights, that is where the right of autonomy may act. It may affect the means, but never the substance of the individual rights.
121 326 U.S. 572 (1946 24 found that the statute imposed substantial costs upon the state and impinged upon the ability of the state to determine the manner in which its money is spent. 25 Clearly, these are interrelated areas.
Where an institution has only a limited income, money which is required in one field will require diminution of expenditures in another field. The actual question is one of disruptiveness to the internal operations of the state, the state's right to be autonomous. While this opinion could have been the platform for the airing of the full considerations making up the right to autonomy, it was not. Indeed, the legal and constitutional analysis was somewhat weak overall. The Court first acknowledged the plenary nature of the interstate commerce power with the obligatory quotations from Gibbons v. Ogden1 26 by the burdensome costs and the impact upon state priority-setting. Consequently, the act was stricken down. As a post-script, the contradictory holding of Maryland v. Wirtz 129 was overruled and the contrary dictum in California v. United States' 30 disapproved. The heart of the decision is, simply put, that "States as States stand on a quite different footing than an individual or a corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce.''M The source of that difference is neither explained nor clarified by the Court, however, and, it is this failure to give fuller body to the right of autonomy which provides the dissent with its plentiful ammunition.
In dissent, Justice Brennan reaffirms the plenary nature of the federal commerce power. First, he establishes the supremacy of the national government.
32 New York is distinguished on the ground of tax immunity of the state, the tax power being held concurrently, while commerce is a plenary power of the national government. 133 It is the Court's failure to fully explain why states are entitled to be treated differently than individuals, for surely the tenth amendment language includes both the states and the people, that must be remedied in order to make clear the substantive nature of the state's right. Justice Brennan's analogy to the discredited logic of Carter v. Carter Coal Co.' 34 and United States v. Butler 1 3 misses the nature of the state's right involved here as compared to the reactionary proclivities exercised in these earlier cases. This difference is the quality of the areas protected by the right of autonomy, a right which Justice Rehnquist does not however, successfully describe. 425-426 (1925) .
'33 Yet, Justice Brennan fails to recognize that the source of the state's tax immunity is the autonomy of the state in the first place. See 426 U.S. at 843 n. 14.
134 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 13' 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
in the Burger Court's progress towards a substantive understanding of the position of the states in the post-Civil War constitutional framework. However, as the dissenting opinion shows, it is not the bottom line which is not understood, but the pathway which leads there. The Supreme Court has thus far been unable coherently to formulate and thereby recognize the right of autonomy. This inability is to a great extent undoubtedly reflective of the nation as a whole, and shows the declining importance, power, and prestige of the states. 36 In passively viewing the passing of the states, the Court has removed itself from the document which it has a duty to faithfully expound.
IV. RIGHT TO AUTONOMY
In summary, then, the Supreme Court in National League of Cities and Stone v. Powell has begun to recognize substantive limitations to the exercise of federal power. As of the moment, though, it has been unable to overcome the rhetoric and the tunnel vision of the past and continues to deal with federal-state relations based upon the tenth amendment structure. This has caused the Court to have to struggle unnecessarily to reach the proper constitutional conclusion in some cases and, occasionally, to miss it altogether.
The right to autonomy is a narrow concept. Since it consists of only those prerogatives necessarily retained by the state in order to preserve the federal nature of the constitutional system, the potential exists for a good deal of disagreement as to where the flash point is. Indeed, the strongest proponents of the right disagree on a very important point of potential application: the ability of the federal government to ensure rights guaranteed to individuals by the Constitution through the Bill of Rights. This ability can be characterized as its oversight power. It is qualitatively distinct in origin, exercise, and goals from the plenary federal powers. [Vol. 68 Douglas found that the state's right to autonomy could not apply to limit the power of the national government. 138 Conversely, Justice Rehnquist and a majority of the current Court have applied the right to autonomy in just such a manner, to the detriment of the federal power.
The right to autonomy concerns the federal personality of the system. It deals only with the direct federal-state relationships. Thus, where the federal government interferes with legitimate state autonomous interests, the state is constitutionally protected. Yet such interests do not reach to those rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed to individuals by the Constitution. These individual interests exist regardless of the federal structure of the system. 39
The autonomous interests of the state are threefold: internal control, internal ordering, and internal integrity. Internal control pertains to the ability of the state to rank order decisional priorities, to be able to decide what gets done first. Internal ordering is the ability of the state to determine the structure and nature of its governmental organizations, to be able to determine what agencies exist and in what sense. Internal integrity describes the ability of "' See note 112 supra. 139 That is, the various constitutional protections guaranteed the general citizenry would be applicable if only the states existed or if only the national government existed. The federal system is superfluous to their vitality and value. the state to protect its interests. These are the minimum necessary for a state to retain its individual character in a world without power. It is the right to autonomy.
V. CONCLUSION
The government in the United States, as established in the Constitution, is a federal system. A federal system requires two tiers of government, non-wholly integrated and semi-independent. Originally, the states were sovereign entities. The course of constitutional interpretation has succeeded in all but depriving them of separate power, as the delegated powers of the national government have become, effectively, all powers. There is some quantum below which any governmental system becomes non-federal in nature, regardless of label. The need to remain above that quantum is a constitutional requirement, as the federal nature of the government is constitutional in quality. That quantum is supplied by the right of the states to be autonomous.
The past one hundred years has been a chronicle of the continuing eclipse of the states in the constitutional framework, often through the myopia of good intentions of the Supreme Court. This eclipse has been the result of the inability of the states to conform to constitutional requirements, the increasing power and import of the national government, and the distaste of states' rights which has lingered from the Civil War even until today. The Supreme Court is only slowly recognizing both the need and the nature of the right of autonomy.
